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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between income inequality and social 
assistance caseload, controlling for unemployment, population and GDP, in the context of the 
city of London, Ontario, from 1993 to 2013. How does an increase or decrease in income 
inequality affect the Social Assistance Services caseload in local governments? Gini coefficients, 
social assistance caseload, and control variables data have been gathered and calculated. As 
research design, it has been used a multiple linear regression statistical analysis, and academic 
investigation. The results of the major research project suggest there is a 68% correlation of the 
regression model with the independent variable of social assistance caseload, but being 
unemployment the strongest explanatory variable. A negative relationship between income 
inequality and social assistance caseload variables was found, but important endogenous 
variables such as policy interventions and macroeconomic cycles have played an important role 
in altering this relationship. On the other hand, the Gini coefficient analysis reveals an 
important and growing income inequality gap, where in average the top 1% Londoner’s earns 
72.33% of the total incomes in the City of London, or even more dramatic the 50% of the 
bottom poorest have only left the 3.86% of total income. The academic research also showed 
that most social assistance recipients are receiving incomes below the poverty line. This paper 
makes some local government recommendations such as graduated property tax and the 
implementation of the Ending Poverty Initiative. At the federal and provincial level a 
comprehensive tax reform is recommended. We conclude by acknowledging the complexity of 
the relationship between variables, and the impact of localized economic dynamics. It is 
encouraged for all levels of government to pay attention to this current historical moment to 
solve the increasing income inequality gap and social assistance caseloads with policies that 
have the public good in mind. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As per Natalie Mehra from the Ontario Common Front, Ontario’s income gap between the 
richest and poorest families is now at levels not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
“Today, the average CEO takes home 250 times the income of the average Canadian, while a 
generation ago that ratio was 25 times the average; in contrast, 40% of Ontario’s families have 
seen almost no income gains or, worse, actual income losses compared to their predecessors 
30 years ago” (Mehra, 2012).  
Municipalities have not been immune to this social and economic problem.  The Ontario’s 
increasing of Social Assistance Services caseload since 2004 by 32% is of great concern to the 
local government. Attempts have been made to link the increasing caseload levels with several 
variables in order to provide forecasting predictive value, and social policy responsiveness, yet 
unsuccessful. Local Governments will benefit greatly from being able to predict caseload and 
budget more appropriately while searching for ways to improve local communities applying 
innovative social local policies such as progressive revenue tools. 
There is empirical evidence that income inequality directly puts pressure in the Social 
Assistance Services system. In the seminal work by the Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, The Price 
of Inequality, he states that high and sustained levels of inequality, especially inequality of 
opportunity can entail large social costs. Entrenched inequality of outcomes can significantly 
undermine individuals’ educational and occupational choices (Stiglitz, 2012). Pandej 
Chintrakarn points out that income inequality as one of the malaises of the XXI century, and 
emphasizes the importance of reducing income inequality not only as a fundamental goal of 
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long-term economic development, but also a means to achieving the other development goals 
relating to poverty reduction. (Chintrakarn , 2011). 
 
Many research studies about income inequality focus have been the world at large, national or 
provincial level, but I have yet to found one study focused on local governments, and 
particularly studying the relationship between income inequality and social assistance services 
caseload. The study then will fill the gap not only studying this important relationship, income 
inequality and Social Assistance caseload, but also within a local government perspective.  
Other reasons to undertake this study at the local government level, particularly the city of 
London is to advance the variables forecasting predictive value, and to learn how these 
relationships play, affect, and can be potentially solved in the local government environment. 
 
The roadmap of this paper will introduce you first to the research question, hypothesis and 
policy questions; then we will present you to the academic review in a fascinating travel 
exploring different dimension of income inequality and social assistance caseload for the 
province of Ontario. Later London’s empirical data will be studied, its findings and analysis of 
evidence undertaken. Afterward we will analyze Gini coefficient data evidence, social assistance 
caseload, unemployment rate, and GDP, population levels, and present the overall multiple 
linear regression findings.  
Federal, Provincial, and local government level policy recommendations will come before, we 
finally conclude after examining various data sources suggesting there is 68% correlation of the 
regression model with the independent variable of social assistance caseload for the period 
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1993-2013. Also, the Gini coefficient reveals an important and growing income inequality for 
the city of London; yet, lower that most neighboring municipality. Social assistance caseload is 
affected by a myriad of variables including local economic dynamics, provincial socio-economic 
policies and global economic cycles. 
 
 
Research question 
How does an increase or decrease in income inequality affect the Social Assistance Services 
caseload in local governments in London, Ontario?  
 
 
Hypothesis 
The rise in the Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality has increased the Social Assistance Services 
caseload in London-Ontario since 1993 until 2013. 
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ACADEMIC REVIEW 
 
 
The reason for conducting the academic review of Social Assistance (AS) and Income Inequality 
(II)1 variables in the context of the Province of Ontario is due to availability of material sources. 
This will present a good theoretical framework to introduce the local level study. 
The following is a compilation of relevant academic research made in the areas of social 
assistance and income inequality in Ontario from the early 80’s into the present 2015. It also 
explores the relationship with control variables such as unemployment, poverty and 
immigration. The review covers a total of a 16 references among which we can find: journal 
papers, peer reviewed papers, association and think-thank reports, newspapers, online 
references, and books.  The academic review is subdivided in the following 6 sections: (1) 
Statistical Data Review on the evolution of Income Inequality (II) and Social Assistance (SA) 
rates in Ontario,  (2) Literature Review on factors that influence II, (3) Ontario's policy evolution 
in relation to II,  (4) Review literature on factors that influence SA rates,  (5) Review of Ontario's 
SA policy evolution in relation to SA rates, and finally (6) Concluding insights. 
  
                                                          
1 II or IE can be used interchangeably in reference to Income Inequality / Equality 
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STATISTICAL DATA REVIEW ON THE EVOLUTION OF INCOME EQUALITY GINI COEFFICIENT AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE CASELOAD IN ONTARIO  
 
Figure 1 shows the graphic evolution of both the Social Assistance caseload and the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality for Ontario. The chart highlights some of the most important 
social and economic policies affecting both indicators from 1993 to 2013. Please see Table 3 in 
the Appendix section for detailed Ontario's Social Assistance & Income Inequality data values. 
 
 
Figure 1: Ontario’s Historical Income Inequality Gini & Socia Asistance Caseload Trends 1993 to 2013 
 
Sources: (Bollman , 2015), (Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 2015). Caseload for 1993 & 1994 is not available. 
CANSIM Table 326-0021 Consumer Price Index (Percentage Change (period-to-period)), annual (2002=100)(2,9) 
Table 204-0002 High income trends of tax filers in Canada, provinces and census metropolitan areas (CMA), specific 
geographic area thresholds, annual (1,2,3,4) 
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The relationship between SA caseload and Inequality appears to be inverse for all the period 
under analysis; in fact it produces a 91% inverse correlation. The SA caseload seems to have a 
general trend downwards, while the Gini coefficient of inequality has an upward trend.  The 
relationship between these two variables is complex due to the introduction exogenous 
variables2. In particular, the social assistance (SA) trend behaviour has been affected for several 
policy and macroeconomic factors. The policy change happened in 1995 under the Harris’ 
government and the implementation of the “Common Sense Revolution” which cut welfare 
rates by 21.6%; consequently triggered a decline of 51% in the total SA caseload. (Finnie & 
Irvine , 2008). Similar effect had the reduction of the unemployment rate by 7% between the 
years 1993 to 2005 (Tiessen, 2016). Another factor affecting greatly the SA caseload was the 
2008 world financial crisis, prompting an increase of about 25% in the Ontario’s caseload. Also, 
the introduction of the childcare benefit between 2009 and 2012 help improve the welfare 
families income; thus constraining the exit of families from the SA caseload. (Tiessen, 2016) 
On the other hand, the Gini coefficient of income inequality shows an increase from 56% in 
1993 to 60.7% in 2013, and increase of 7.3%, it seem small for this period, however to be fair, it 
has had a persistent growth since the previous two decades. Some of the policy factors 
affecting this coefficient are: Tax Cuts, Social Programs dismantled, and Income transfer 
declined. (Tiessen, 2016) 
Will the Ontario’s trends equate with the city of London findings? 
The following sections will study the in detail the different variable evolution and factors 
affecting social assistance in Ontario. 
                                                          
2 A factor whose value is determined by variables outside the causal system under study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE INCOME EQUALITY 
 
The chief factors contributing to increasing income inequality among Ontarians are the 
different labour, fiscal and economic policies implemented in the last decades. Factor such as 
labour policies are not constrained to the provincial realm, but more the result of a worldwide 
movement toward globalization. Fiscal and economic policies appear to be more a function of 
the provincial political fluctuations between conservative and liberal governments. Finally some 
alternatives policies offer solutions for the increasing income inequality will be presented. 
Labour Policy 
The evidence suggests that globalization has affected income inequality. Trade openness is 
clearly an important factor behind the rise in inequality across Canadian provinces. The findings 
also clearly indicate that other factors have had a large impact on income inequality. In 
particular, the decline of manufacturing employment (deindustrialization) appears to have had 
a strong negative impact on inequality. Increases in the unemployment rate, technological 
change and educational heterogeneity also contributed to rising inequality. In contrast, the 
influence of increasing female participation rates seems to have dampened total income 
inequality. There is some evidence that de-unionization increased inequality although the 
results are not robust across inequality measures. (Breau, 2007) 
Other causes of inequality, dominant among those would be variables reflecting the changing 
nature of employment relations, for example, contract or part-time work, etc. (Feenstra and 
Hanson 1996, 1999; Morris and Western 1999), and international capital flows (FDI) on a 
provincial basis. Closer investigation of the relative impact of these factors at the provincial 
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level (see, for instance, Davis 1980) and the sub-provincial level is also warranted. (Breau, 2007) 
Fiscal, Economic, and Restructuring Policies 
Undeniable, also, is the fact that it is not the inexorable march of global economics alone, but 
rather choices – choices in public budgets, and in economic and social policy – that have failed 
to rein in the increasing income inequality distributed by the private market and aided in 
propelling us down this path.  
Growing inequality resulting from runaway incomes at the top and a harshly restructured 
labour force for middle and lower income earners, have meant that almost half the population 
of an entire generation of Ontario’s families has worked harder but not enjoyed the rewards of 
their increased labour. The long stretches of economic growth experienced in this province 
since 1980 have been hijacked by the wealthiest at the expense of middle and lower income 
brackets. In fact, most of these families are falling behind, despite putting more hours into the 
workforce. These trends have disproportionately impacted women, racialized communities, 
aboriginals, seniors and children. (Mehra, 2012) 
Ontario’s governments have failed to mitigate the growing inequality distributed by the private 
market. Government choices – in budgets and in economic and social policy – have relentlessly 
favored the interests of the wealthy over the rest. Ontario’s budgets for the last fifteen years 
have repeatedly prioritized tax cuts while casting concomitant cuts to social programs as 
necessities rather than choices. Social policies that temper inequalities experienced by women 
and racialized communities have been dismantled. Social programs that benefit all Ontarians 
and redistribute income through free public services such as education and health care face 
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relentless budget pressure. User fees and requirements for out-of-pocket payment for public 
services are on the rise. (Mehra, 2012) 
Public sector restructuring is aping the private sector trend of soaring incomes at the top and 
precarious job security for many. Income transfer programs such as social assistance and 
disability have declined precipitously as inflation has outpaced meager increases. Paltry support 
for assisted housing and cuts to community service budgets has left families and individuals to 
suffer the impacts of growing inequality without aid. Federal program cuts to unemployment 
insurance have had a grave impact on Ontario workers suffering from the 2008 recession. The 
result is that Ontario has the fastest growing income inequality and among the largest leaps in 
poverty rates of anywhere in Canada.  (Mehra, 2012) 
Policy Alternatives 
There is no question that Ontario can and should take action to improve our record on equality. 
Across Canada, many provinces are doing much better than Ontario in supporting income 
transfers and public programs. Around the world, even in this era of global economic 
restructuring, there are plentiful examples of countries that develop economic policies to 
benefit the public interest and social policies that promote social inclusion and relative equity. 
Currently, within Ontario, policy recommendations have been made by academics, policy 
experts, and public interest groups to pay attention to the choices that our governments are 
making policies that benefit the few at the expense of the public interest. (Herd, 2003 ). We all 
have the ability to pressure our governments to make better choices. Indeed, it is our obligation 
to the next generation to do so. (Mehra, 2012) 
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There are alternatives. No province is perfect, but trends from across the country shows that 
Ontario’s budget and social policy choices are just that – choices. Ontario – a province with a 
relatively large GDP, extraordinary education attainment levels and vast economic resources -- 
now ranks at the very bottom of Canada in funding all social programs and services. Corporate 
tax cuts have dominated Ontario’s budgets to the point that this province in now one of the 
lowest tax jurisdictions in all of North America, despite evidence that corporations are not using 
their largess to invest in Ontario. Economic strategy is rarely debated – and aside from 
continual tax cuts and privatization of social programs, it appears to be virtually nonexistent. 
Ontario ranks at or near the bottom of the country in funding for vital public programs such as 
housing and health care while tuitions and user fees here are the highest in Canada.  (Mehra, 
2012) 
As if it is not enough that “the poor are always with us”; today’s poorest families rising children 
are much poorer than the families that preceded them a generation ago. The after-tax income 
gap is at a 30-year high and tracking higher than the national trend. Ontario is one of the most 
prosperous jurisdictions in the world. Is this as good as it gets? The vital role of government is 
to redistribute incomes, to whatever degree society deems acceptable.  It is required to keep 
the whole production/consumption machine humming through the ups and downs of the 
business cycle.  (Yalnizyan , 2007) 
   
15 
 
ONTARIO'S POLICY EVOLUTION IN RELATION TO INCOME EQUALITY 
 
Although, the study examines the evolution of Income Equality since 1993, the preceding 
decade has been included as it sets important antecedents for the years to come. For a year-by-
year summary of IE policies evolution please see Table 4 in the Appendix section. 
 
Within the period from 1981 to 1999 cutbacks to government spending on social programs also 
contributed to the rise in inequality. The more difficult question to answer here is to what 
extent rollbacks in government spending can be associated with global pressures to reduce 
deficit loads and efforts to make provincial economies more competitive (via lower tax bur- 
dens) on the international arena.  (Breau, 2007) 
In Breau’s article, panel data methods were used to investigate the factors behind the rise of 
total income inequality across Canadian provinces from 1981 to 1999. Overall, the results 
suggest that a combination of several factors contributed to rising income inequality, in line 
with results from previous studies also suggesting there is no single ‘smoking gun’ (Gustafsson 
and Johansson 1999).  
In 2012, six hundred thousand Ontario families find their incomes stalled or falling behind, 
while the richest ten per cent gallop away with the bounty from the sustained period of 
economic growth stretching from the mid-1990s to 2008. A decade-and-a-half of budgets that, 
with few exceptions, prioritized tax cuts for the wealthy over equality-creating public programs, 
have elongated the gap. These policy choices have helped turn surpluses into deficits at both 
the provincial and federal levels. Now, having deliberately emptied its cupboards, the Ontario 
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government’s commitment to reduce child poverty by 25 per cent by 2013 is being swept aside.  
(Mehra, 2012) 
In a departure from previous generations ranging back to the post-World War era, Ontario’s 
rising income inequality has persisted for an entire generation. It has now outpaced the rest of 
the country.  
From 1945 to 1980, all across Canada, economic growth was accompanied by increasing 
income shared by a comparatively wide segment of the population (though of course this 
sharing was uneven and historically marginalized groups continued to experience real 
disproportionate disadvantage): children of all economic classes were expected to live better 
lives than their parents. But over the last 30 years an immoderate proportion of the yields from 
economic growth have been taken by the wealthiest. Today, the average CEO takes home 250 
times the income of the average Canadian, while a generation ago that ratio was 25 times the 
average.  The chief means by which families have stabilized their incomes is through putting 
more hours into the workforce. But despite the intensification of work among the middle and 
lower income brackets in the last generation, Ontario has seen among the biggest jumps in 
poverty rates and intensity of all provinces.  (Mehra, 2012) 
When the wave of downsizing of public and private enterprises in Ontario subsided in the late-
1990s and the province’s economy began to enjoy sustained growth. Post-1998, Ontario’s 
earnings gap shrank back to below national levels. But that has not translated to a better-than-
average distribution of incomes at the end of the day, in after-tax terms. (Yalnizyan , 2007) 
Between 1976 and 1996, Ontario’s after-tax income gap between the richest and poorest 10% 
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of families raising children was in step with the national trend. But after the mid-1990s, Ontario 
shot past the national average, and there is no sign of reversal in sight. Poverty is, of course, the 
greatest concern in growing income inequality. Stubborn poverty is always of concern, but it 
makes a difference if it occurs in generalized poor economic conditions or in generally buoyant 
economic conditions. That’s why it is important to understand what happens along the full 
breadth of the income distribution, not just focus on what happens at the bottom. (Yalnizyan , 
2007) 
In after-tax terms, the fortunes of the bottom 40% of families raising children in Ontario have 
stalled over the course of a generation. This despite steady economic growth in Ontario post-
1998. It appears more than 600,000 families at the bottom end of the income spectrum are 
falling behind, shut out from the fruits of sustained growth. (In 2004, there were slightly more 
than 1,530,000 families raising children under 18 in Ontario. ere are roughly 153,000 families in 
each decile.) In after-tax terms, Chart 3 indicates only clear winners, post-1998, were those 
families who already were at the upper end of the income scale. (Yalnizyan , 2007) 
The greatest increase in incomes occurred for the richest 10% of Ontario’s families raising 
children. The median earned family income for the richest 10% grew by 41% in inflation-
adjusted terms between the late-1970s and early 2000s, to around $181,000 — a rate of 
increase that is unparalleled in Canada. Families in the bottom 40% of the income spectrum 
actually lost ground despite the fact that they worked more weeks, on average, in the labour 
market. In 1976, families that earned less than approximately $17,000 in Ontario (in inflation-
adjusted 2004 dollars) fell into the category of the poorest 10% of families raising children 
under 18. By 2004, the threshold had dropped considerably: the poorest 10% of families raising 
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children in Ontario earned less than $10,700. (Yalnizyan , 2007) 
The story is similar for the poorest three deciles. The upper limits of earnings in those deciles 
fell in response to the recession of 1981–82, then recovered slightly, only to fall even more 
dramatically after the 1990–91 recession. Almost 30 years later (2010’s), with economic 
conditions that have been compared to the glory days of 40 years ago, those markers of what 
denotes the poorest and the near poor have still not rebounded from the impact of profound 
labour market restructuring that has taken place over the past two decades. (Yalnizyan , 2007) 
Ontario’s slow recovery from the 2008 recession and devastating losses to employment in the 
manufacturing and resource sectors will now be further challenged by cuts in the public sector 
and income transfer programs. Ontario’s austerity budget – heralding five years of 
retrenchment and a government -created recession in the public sector - will undoubtedly 
accelerate Ontario’s growing inequality and poverty unless a more balanced approach to public 
policy is restored. Ontario’s current sprint toward austerity is occurring in the context of grave 
inequality. Income inequality has outpaced the rest of the country since the 1990s. While the 
wealthiest have bolted ahead, the bottom 40 per cent of Ontarians’ incomes are flagging. This 
province has seen the biggest jump in poverty rates in Canada. Yet Ontario’s budget plan asks 
almost nothing of high-income Ontarians who are taking home more than ever. In fact, the 
province’s 2008 five-year commitment to reduce child poverty by 25 per cent has been 
abandoned in the budget; rather, child benefits have been cut and delayed. The province’s 
deficit will be paid primarily through job cuts in public sector, service cuts, and public funding 
curtailments to income support and other programs. (Mehra, 2012) 
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In her 2007 study of Ontario’s growing gap in income and wealth economist Armine Yalnizyan 
reports that even prior to the economic recession of 2008, in a period of prolonged economic 
growth, income inequality worsened in Ontario:  
“Income disparities in Ontario have soared for the past decade, though the economy has been 
strong. And it’s not just a story about the tail ends of the distribution, the richest and the 
poorest. Fully 40% of Ontario’s families have seen almost no income gains or, worse, actual 
income losses compared to their predecessors 30 years ago.  
These kinds of trends are expected during recessionary periods, but this is occurring during one 
of Ontario’s most sustained periods of economic expansion.  
In 2012, Ontario is at or near the bottom of the country in measures of income inequality and 
economic security. The Gini coefficient measures income inequality. Statistics Canada uses 
after-tax income to construct the Gini coefficient. 
For only a short period of time—between 1993 and 1997—Ontario’s earnings gap between the 
top 10% and bottom 10% was dramatically higher than the Canadian earnings gap in most 
provinces. This is one indication of the severity of the re cession of the early 1990s, which 
starkly recast the labour market and left so many Ontarians jobless and underemployed. 
(Yalnizyan , 2007) 
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LITERATURE REVIEW ON FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE  
 
As per the evidence presented in this academic review, the main factors affecting social 
assistance are the introduction of the rate-reduction, which triggered reduction of SA caseloads 
by 51% from 1994 to 2004. The opposite effect was gained in the 2008 global financial crisis 
that elevated the unemployment rates, consequently, increasing SA caseload by 32%. Also the 
introduction in 2012 of the Ontario’s child Benefit had important effects in the SA caseload. 
Mike Harris’ and his Progressive Conservative Party promised voters a “common sense 
revolution” that included income tax reductions, cuts in welfare rates and mandatory work-for- 
welfare programs. Subsequently, welfare benefits were cut in October 1995 by 21.6 percent for 
all recipients, aside from people with disabilities and seniors. (Finnie & Irvine , 2008). 
Kaylie Tiessen from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives concludes that the poverty 
gap—the distance between total benefit income and the poverty line—for people who qualify 
for social assistance has worsened over time, especially so for single people receiving Ontario 
Works. Some of society’s harshest judgments are reserved for people who receive social 
assistance benefits. What is clear from this analysis is that those judgments have influenced the 
policy of successive governments, which, in turn, has resulted in the gross inadequacy of total 
benefit incomes for this group of people. As a result, they have become some of the most 
marginalized and vulnerable in our communities. If the government is serious about its 
commitment to improve income security for adults, this is a file that must be addressed. 
(Tiessen, 2016) 
Macroeconomic conditions have an extremely strong impact on SA rates. The decline in the 
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unemployment rate from a high of 12 percent in 1993 to between 6 and 7 percent at the end of 
the analysis in 2005, it was the single most important factor in reducing the incidence of SA 
benefits, as well as the underlying annual entry rates that play such an important role in driving 
those annual levels. In the early 1990s, the federal government introduced the GST credit in an 
effort to redress the regressive nature of the GST on low-income people. (Tiessen, 2016) 
Then in 2008, the principal factors that have driven the increase the number of welfare-
dependent individuals, include economic conditions (as captured by the unemployment rate), 
the levels of benefits available to SA recipients, the generosity of the EI system (on the 
assumption that SA and EI may be functionally related for potential SA recipients), and a set of 
calendar year variables to capture other policy-related developments. (Finnie & Irvine , 2008) 
The Fraser Institute authored a report called Welfare—No Fair: A Critical Analysis of Ontario’s 
Welfare System (1985-1994). In this report the ideological seeds for the cuts in welfare rates 
have been planted.  Here some of the arguments: “The Institute has been concerned about the 
conditions under which welfare is advanced in Canada. There are two reasons for this. First, 
generous welfare programs can have a negative effect on recipients. Second, the conditions 
under which welfare is delivered may create an inequity between donors and recipients. For a 
long time, economists and sociologists have recognized that the availability of support from the 
state creates an incentive for people to organize their lives in such a way as to take advantage 
of the benefits available. At the margin, people’s decisions are influenced by the incentives that 
are provided. Young people faced with what they regard as a “tyrannical regime” in their home, 
opt for an independent life at the tax expense of their parents and their neighbors. Workers 
with seasonal employment begin to rely on, and then plan on, collecting welfare as bridging 
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financing to tide over them from when their unemployment insurance runs out to when their 
next job starts. Single mothers, seeing no husbands with equal earning power, in effect marry 
the state as their best available option” (Sabatini & Nightingale , 1996). 
The report challenges our welfare assumptions with the following question:  
Why should we accept that welfare recipients are the most vulnerable in our society, as liberals 
suggest—as opposed to children, seniors, people with disabilities, or the working poor, for 
example? (Sabatini & Nightingale , 1996) 
ONTARIO'S POLICY EVOLUTION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE RATES 
 
This section examines the Ontario’s policy evolution of Social Assistance. For a year-by-year 
summary of SA policies evolution please see Table 3 in the Appendix section. 
In 1989 the total benefit income from these Social Assistance sources as a share of the Low 
Income Measure After Tax (LIM-AT) was much higher than it is today: a single person qualifying 
for the equivalent of Ontario Works (OW) in 1989 could expect a total benefit income that was 
about 40% below the poverty line. The gap was 10% for a single person with a disability and 
20% for a couple with two children. By 2014, the gap had widened dramatically to 59%. People 
receiving benefits from Ontario’s social assistance programs are living in a greater depth of 
poverty now than a generation ago. (Tiessen, 2016) 
Ontario was hit particularly hard by the recession that began in 1990, and unemployment 
increased dramatically – virtually doubling between 1989 and 1991. The number of welfare-
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dependent individuals climbed to 929,900 in 1991 and further to almost 1.4 million by 1994. 
Meanwhile, the government’s finances were sharply affected by the federal government’s 
decision in 1990 to limit increases in federal SA cost sharing to Ontario, Alberta and BC to 5 
percent per annum. (Finnie & Irvine , 2008). 
The decline in the unemployment rate from a high of 12 percent in 1993 to between 6 and 7 
percent at the end of the analysis in 2005, it was the single most important factor in reducing 
the incidence of SA benefits, as well as the underlying annual entry rates that play such an 
important role in driving those annual levels. In the early 1990s, the federal government 
introduced the GST credit in an effort to redress the regressive nature of the GST on low-
income people. This new credit had the impact of increasing total benefit income for people 
who qualified for social assistance. In 1993, three federal child benefits were re- placed by a 
single benefit targeted to low-income families. Called the Child Tax Benefit, this change resulted 
in increased income for the working poor, but left unchanged the total benefit income for 
families who qualified for social assistance. In 1995, a new provincial government dealt a severe 
blow to the incomes of any Ontarian qualifying for social assistance: the rate for basic 
assistance (what became OW) was cut by 21.6%. That was the single biggest cut to social 
assistance incomes in the province’s history. That government then froze both OW and ODSP 
rates for the rest of its time in office.  (Tiessen, 2016) 
The cutbacks to welfare in Ontario, in contrast to Alberta, came primarily in the form of rate 
reductions, and secondarily in the form of increased barriers to recipiency. In the June 1995 
election campaign Mike Harris and his Progressive Conservative Party promised voters a 
“common sense revolution” that included income tax reductions, cuts in welfare rates and 
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mandatory work-for- welfare programs. Subsequently, welfare benefits were cut in October 
1995 by 21.6 percent for all recipients, aside from people with disabilities and seniors, which 
represented a dramatic change of direction from the preceding New Democratic Party and 
Liberal Party governments. (Finnie & Irvine , 2008). 
In 1997 the Progressive Conservative provincial government joined forces with Andersen 
Consulting to design a new delivery system for SA. Front and center in the business 
transformation (BTP) were concerns about rising caseloads and costs, notably from perceived 
fraud. Consequently, the new system was design to combine new technology with tighter 
verification procedures to meet its goals of reducing costs and improving both program 
integrity and client service. The new system has been in operation since 2002 and incudes the 
following key features: (1) A common province-wide database; (2) Two-step intake process to 
reduce number of client interviews; (3) third party interfaces to provide automated verification 
of client information; and (4) streamlined case management to reduce staff time.  (Herd, 2003 ) 
In 1998, the federal and provincial governments joined together on the creation of the National 
Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS), an additional income benefit for families with children in low 
income. The NCBS, however, specifically allowed the provinces to claw back that benefit from 
families who were receiving social assistance. It wasn’t until 2004 that Ontario families on social 
assistance saw the benefit of a small increased flow through amount, while most of the NCBS 
continued to be deducted from their OW or ODSP benefits. In 2008, with the advent of the 
Ontario Child Benefit, the NCBS clawback was ended. Basic needs benefits for families with 
children have been reduced since then to take all benefits for children out of the OW and ODSP 
systems. While there has been much movement in the different policy tools used to deliver 
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total benefit income for people who qualify for social assistance, progress towards any measure 
of adequacy has been stilted. Inadequate income for Ontarians who qualify for social assistance 
benefits—who are among the province’s poorest Ontarians—remains one of the longest lasting 
legacies of the “Common Sense Revolution” of the mid-1990s.  (Tiessen, 2016) 
In 2003, a new provincial government, led by former Premier Dalton McGuinty, was elected. It 
was expected that this new government would reverse at least some of the damage to social 
assistance, but progress has been halting, to say the least. By 2011, the total benefit income for 
an adult qualifying for OW benefits fell to 60% below the poverty line, making the poverty gap 
for those who qualify for social assistance in Ontario considerably larger than it was a 
generation ago.  (Tiessen, 2016) 
The McGuinty government was elected in 2003 with the expectation that the erosion of income 
security for those who qualify for social assistance would be reversed. The erosion of rates 
compared to the poverty line may have slowed after that election, but only couples with two 
children on OW experience a smaller poverty gap today compared to 2003.  Looking back to 
2008, when the first poverty reduction strategy was implemented, there has since been some 
improvement in the poverty gap for all family types except single people who qualify for ODSP. 
These gains were not due to a restoration of social assistance rates, though they have increased 
slightly. For families with children, most of the improvement in the poverty gap has come 
through federal and provincial child benefits. Both the provincial and federal governments have 
invested in increased child tax benefits, which are also delivered outside of the social assistance 
system.  (Tiessen, 2016) 
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Social Assistance (SA) participation rates appear to be significantly affected by the dollar value 
of the benefits available from the program, and the fall in the real dollar value of SA benefits 
after the mid-1990s played an important role in reducing SA rates over our period of analysis. 
Furthermore, a less generous EI system appears to decrease (not increase) SA rates, suggesting 
the programs are complements rather than substitutes, and changes in the EI program also 
contributed to the decline in SA rates. Welfare reforms that limited eligibility or otherwise 
made it more difficult to collect SA, as well as changes in other income support programs such 
as the CTB/NCB appear to have further driven SA rates downward. (Finnie & Irvine , 2008). 
The Ontario Child Benefit has proven to be a real workhorse: in 2009, the OCB was increased to 
a maximum of $1,100 annually per child in that year. By 2013, more than 530,000 families 
received a benefit worth a maximum of $1,210 per child. The benefit increased to $1,310 in 
2014. And in 2015, the Ontario Child Benefit was indexed to inflation to ensure families don’t 
lose the value of the benefit to the rising cost of living. In the 2011 budget, Ontario introduced 
the Trillium Benefit. It combined three pre-existing tax credits available to all low-income 
Ontarians. These credits were formerly paid out either quarterly or in an annual lump sum 
after-tax filing, but starting in 2012, they began to be paid on a monthly basis. The change did 
not increase total benefit income, but the monthly delivery provided a more stable source of 
funds to mitigate cost of living. The Trillium Benefit and the federal GST credit are both 
adjusted for inflation to protect against the erosion of their value due to the rising cost of living. 
(Tiessen, 2016) 
In an effort to recognize the extent of the poverty gap experienced by single people receiving 
Ontario Works—the poorest of all who qualify for social assistance—the government invested 
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in annual top ups of $14 a month in 2013, $25 a month in 2014 and $20 a month in 2015. 
Unfortunately, for all other family types, rate increases have not been robust enough to even 
compensate for the rising cost of living, let alone move total benefit income to- ward any 
measure of adequacy. Revealing just how complicated this file has become, here are a few 
more changes made by government since the poverty reduction strategy began: The current 
provincial government has made some effort to raise both OW and ODSP rates, with 1% 
increases in each of the past three years and 1.5% to come this fall. But the dependants of 
people qualifying for ODSP have not been subject to the 1 per cent increase, leaving families 
receiving ODSP further behind.  (Tiessen, 2016) 
Economist Hugh Mackenzie reports “by the end of the 2012-13 fiscal year, Ontarians who rely 
on social assistance and disability benefits will have lost $200 million to inflation, thanks to only 
a 1 per cent increase in benefits in 2011 and none in 2012”  
Other reforms have taking place in 2013, such as increased employment exemptions, asset 
levels and gift amounts, were welcomed by advocates as positive contributions to improving 
the programs. However, benefit reductions proposed or enacted in 2012 and 2014 were met 
with significant resistance. Government either abandoned these changes or mitigated the 
negative impact of the changes with new investments. By 2014, the gap had widened 
dramatically to 59%. People receiving benefits from Ontario’s social assistance programs are 
living in a greater depth of poverty now than a generation ago. As of December 2015, there 
were 900,000 Ontarians—654,000 adults and 253,000 children—relying on Ontario Works and 
ODSP to meet their basic needs. (Tiessen, 2016) 
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REVIEW OF CONTROL VARIABLES FACTORS & EVOLUTION 
 
This study has included additional control variables such as Unemployment Rate, Population 
Growth and GDP in order to better understand their relationship with Social Assistance 
Caseload in Ontario. It is also studied the relationship between poverty, income inequality and 
social assistance. Lastly, an integrative local perspective is considered as well. 
Unemployment 
The decline in the unemployment rate from a high of 12 percent in 1993 to between 6 and 7 
percent at the end of the period of analysis was the single most important factor in reducing 
the incidence of Social Assistance benefits, as well as the underlying annual entry rates that 
play such an important role in driving those annual levels (Finnie & Irvine , 2008). This suggests 
a clear connection between employment and social assistance caseload.   
There is some evidence of a direct correlation between unemployment and under-employment 
with in social assistance caseload increases. The downward pressure on incomes at the low end 
of the income scale has major implications for social assistance recipients trying to move into 
employment as, increasingly, ―work doesn‘t pay (Lankin & Sheikh , 2012).  
 
Population 
The relationship between Population growth and Social Assistance Caseload may be coming 
from the characteristics of new immigrants, which according with the Social Assistance Review 
Report, 13% of primary applicants to social assistance services are newcomers who have been 
in Canada for five years or less. Newcomers who are refugee claimants make up about 7% of 
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primary applicants to social assistance services while newcomers who are sponsored 
immigrants represent less than one per cent (Lankin & Sheikh , 2012). Newcomers are 
accounting for a total 21% of the increase in the social assistance caseload. 
Regarding the direct relationship between population growth and income inequality, there are 
oppose research results. For example, Lankin’s study links population growth and poverty with 
the rise in income inequality. Newcomers are accounting for a total 21% of the increase in the 
social assistance caseload (Lankin & Sheikh , 2012); however, in another Breau’s research the 
influence of immigration on inequality across Canadian provinces was found to be insignificant. 
(Breau, 2007). 
Poverty 
Regarding the relationship between poverty and social assistance, the Report from the 
Commission for review of Social Assistance, Brighter Prospects: Transforming Social Assistance 
in Ontario concludes the following: “The changes in the labour market over the last 20 years 
have been significant, in Ontario and throughout Canada. The prevalence of temporary and 
part-time jobs, often at low wages and without stability or health benefits, directly affects 
people‘s ability to exit social assistance.” (Lankin & Sheikh , 2012). Temporary-low-pay-jobs 
have been usually been linked to be a factors exacerbating income inequality; hence, this 
relationship underlines the unexplored deeper correlation between factors associated with 
income inequality and the increase of social assistance caseloads in Ontario during the last two 
decades. Furthermore, the report also identifies the urgent need to address increasing income 
inequality and the erosion we have seen, over time, in the effectiveness of our tax-transfer 
system in dealing with this growing challenge. The downward pressure on incomes at the low 
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end of the income scale has major implications for social assistance recipients trying to move 
into employment as, increasingly, ―work doesn‘t pay. (Lankin & Sheikh , 2012) 
Multiple studies prior to the 2008 worldwide financial crisis, pointed out to the fact that social 
assistance caseload have gone down due to the changes in policies introduced in Ontario during 
the government of Mike Harris, which not only reduced the assistance amounts, but also made 
more stringent for applicants to access the welfare system. (Finnie & Irvine , 2008) 
 
 
CONCLUDING INSIGHTS 
 
In our study of the Ontario’s policy evolution in the fronts of social assistance and income 
inequality, we ask the research question in the provincial context: Is income inequality affecting 
the social assistance caseload in Ontario? The academic research suggests that in Ontario, the 
1995 provincial policy to cut the social assistance rates has triggered not only an abrupt 
diminution in the caseload levels, but also a wave of poverty that currently places a single 
person receiving social assistance at a staggering 59% below the poverty line (Tiessen, 2016).   
Hence, it is suggested by the empirical findings that income inequality may have been increased 
in the last 20 years by the rise in poverty as a result of inadequate levels of social assistance 
payment rates. As per Breau 2007 states “Cutbacks to government spending on social programs 
also contributed to the rise in inequality”.   
Another factor that seems to have had an important effect in skyrocketing the social assistance 
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caseload and income inequality was the 2008/09 economic crises. At this point the income 
inequality levels, and social assistance caseload start having a closer association. Furthermore, 
the income inequality coefficient seems to have been affected directly by provincial policies in 
the last 15 years, which prioritized tax cuts while casting simultaneous cuts to social programs. 
Income transfer programs such as social assistance and disability have declined precipitously as 
inflation has outpaced meager increases (Mehra, 2012). 
In addition, the introduction of the monthly Ontario Child Benefit in 2011 payment, and the 
decision to stop its claw back from the total social assistance payment, seems to have had a 
positive effect on improving the income for families, and also reduced the need for them to 
drop from welfare; consequently, increasing social assistance caseload. 
The evidence suggests that macroeconomics3 alone is not to blame for the inequality and social 
assistance caseload current provincial status, but very significantly, the policy choices made by 
the provincial governments of the day– choices in public budgets, and in economic and social 
policy. “Policies that have relentlessly favored the interests of the wealthy over the rest.” 
(Mehra, 2012). 
 
  
                                                          
3 Some of them are Unemployment, technological change, de-unionization, and education heterogeneity. 
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LOCAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Subsequently, in London in the year 2012, the social assistance caseload began to increase, and 
as per Patrick Maloney, from The London Free Press in 2012 article: “While much of Canada has 
shaken off the brutal after-effects of the 2008-09 economic meltdown, London’s welfare load 
— the last-resort safety net after the jobless exhaust all their benefits — remains stubbornly 
high, up 47% since 2006.”  A direct consequence of economic meltdowns is the increase in 
unemployment rates, previously demonstrated to have a direct correlation with increases in 
social assistance caseload. Thousands of jobs, especially in manufacturing, were wiped out, 
leaving London with one of Canada’s highest big-city jobless rates. Estimates are the city has 
shed $1 billion in annual payroll since 2007, and tough-times barometers such as food-bank 
usage remain persistently high. (London Free Press, 2012). As previously stated, here we not 
only observed the same relationship between employment and Social Assistance levels, but 
also the connection with poverty. 
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EMPRIRICAL DATA 
 
Methodology 
The Reason to undertake this study at the local government level, particularly the city of 
London is twofold: (1) as former member of City of London’s Community Services Department, I 
experienced first hand the strategic importance of good social assistance caseload projections; 
therefore, finding new variable relationships may considerably help to improve the forecasting 
process, (2) knowing this as a result of the academic research, there is no precedent of studying 
these variable relationships (Social Assistance and Income Equality) at the municipal level; 
therefore, it is just appropriate trying to learn how these, often higher level of government 
issues, affect and can be potentially solved in the local government environment. 
 
Data Sources 
Unemployment rate, GDP, and population data required for the regression analysis was 
obtained from the Canadian Socio Economic Database from Statistics Canada (CANSIM). The 
Gini coefficient was calculated using the Lorenz curve methodology, and using data from the 
CANSIN tables. The social assistance caseload was obtained directly from the Ministry of 
Community and social Services, and through the City of London’s Planning and Research 
Department. Once the previous data was ready, we have proceeded to calculate the multiple 
linear regressions.  
The multiple linear regressions were calculated using the statistical software XLSTAT, which is 
an add-in for Microsoft Excel. 
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Following, we will briefly describe the most important elements of the data methodology: 
 
Gini Coefficient 
According to the Dictionary of Economics, the Gini Coefficient is usually defined mathematically 
based on the Lorenz curve, which plots the proportion of the total income of the population (y 
axis) that is cumulatively earned by the bottom x% of the population (See Figure 2). The line at 
45 degrees thus represents perfect equality of incomes. The Gini coefficient can then be 
thought of as the ratio of the area that lies between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve 
(marked A in Figure 2) over the total area under the line of equality (marked A and B in Figure 
2); i.e., G = A / (A + B). 
Figure 2: Lorenz Curve 
 
Source: Wikipedia (Wikipedia, 2015) 
Using the methodology suggested by the Australian data scientist Peter Rosenmai; we have 
calculated the Gini coefficient, as follows the calculation steps:  
Once n incomes have been supplied. Then, n+1 points may then describe the Lorenz 
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curve. Call these (x1,y1),...,(xn+1,yn+1). To determine these points, first we have reordered 
the supplied incomes smallest to largest. Next, determined the cumulative totals for the 
incomes. Call these c1,...,cn+1. We then have xi=100(i-1)/n and yi=100(ci/cn+1) for 
i=1,...,n+1. 
Note, of course, that (x1,y1)=(0,0) and (xn+1,yn+1) = (100,100). Also note that cn+1 is the 
sum of all incomes. The Gini index equals 100 + (100 - 2S)/n where S=y1+...+yn+1. This can 
easily be proved using basic mathematics. The Gini coefficient is the Gini index divided 
by 100. 
The Gini Coefficient has been calculated using an Excel spreadsheet model provided by Peter 
Rosenmai. (Rosenmai, 2012) 
The same methodology was used across all calculated Gini Coefficients (Canada, Ontario, 
Toronto, London, Kitchener region, and Windsor). It has been used five of the available income 
percentiles such as top 1%, bottom 99%, bottom 95%, bottom 90%, and bottom 50% of the 
income after tax with capital gains spectrum. 
 Top 1 percent income group  
 Bottom 99 percent income group  
 Bottom 95 percent income group  
 Bottom 90 percent income group  
 Bottom 50 percent income group  
 
This previous methodology; although consistent for this study calculations, and is 
mathematically correct; it does not guarantee comparability with similar Gini Coefficient 
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estimates outside this paper, as the income percentiles selected for the calculation could have 
been different, which can yield different Gini Coefficient results. 
 
Social Assistance Caseload 
The social assistance caseload was obtained in monthly caseloads since 1991. The annual SA 
caseload was obtained by averaging the twelve months caseloads for every year. The social 
assistance caseload is composed of various categories of participants both independent, and 
families. 
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FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Comparative Gini Coefficient Analysis4 
 
Figure 3: Gini Coefficient Compartive adjusted by consumer index 1982 to 2013 (Income After Tax with 
Capital Gains) 
 
Sources:  
CANSIM Table 326-0021 Consumer Price Index (Percentage Change (period-to-period)), annual (2002=100)(2,9) 
Table 204-0002 High income trends of tax filers in Canada, provinces and census metropolitan areas (CMA), specific 
geographic area thresholds, annual (1,2,3,4) 
 
The same methodology was used across all Gini Coefficients. We have used five of the available such as top 1%, bottom 
99%, bottom 95%, bottom 90%, and bottom 50% of the income after tax with capital gains spectrum. 
 
                                                          
4 The calculated Gini Coefficients are not intended to be comparable with outside of this paper’s coefficients, but only within 
this research study.  
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The rationale for analysing the Gini Coefficients in this section since 1982 is to show a more 
contextualized period of time where the rising trend is clear, and expose the limitations 
associated with short spans-of-time analysis, and data availability. 
 
The analysis of the data evidence shows that the city of Toronto tops the income inequality 
rank in the last 32 years, since 1982 with a Gini coefficient of 0.55 up to 0.654 in 2013; in 
contrast, the city of London had a Gini coefficient of 0.548 in 2013. London’s coefficient is at the 
bottom of the five different city/regions analysed. It is important to indicate the degree of 
London’s change in the coefficient since 1982, when it was 0.496, which represents an increase 
of 11.5%5 in the last 32 years. This increase is considerably lower than city-region of Kitchener-
Waterloo-Cambridge with an overall increase of 18.3% or Toronto with an increase of 15.3%. 
Nevertheless, London’s Gini coefficient in 2013 ranks lower than the Canadian coefficient of 
0.599 or the Ontario’s at 0.607, it still shows erosion in the level of income equality in the last 
31 years at a rate of 11.5%6, this translates in the following income distributions averages for 
the year 2013:  
 
The poorest 50% of the population have 3.86% of total income in London 
The poorest 90% of the population have 11.14% of total income in London 
The poorest 95% of the population have 19.04% of total income in London 
The poorest 99% of the population have 27.69% of total income in London 
The Top 1% of the population have 72.33% of total income in London 
 
 
                                                          
5 & 5 Percentage of Gini Coefficient increase from 1982 to 2013 
 
39 
 
Figure 4: Gini Coefficient Interpretation 
 
Reiterating, in average the top 1% of population have 72.33% of the total income in the City of 
London, or even more dramatic the 50% of the bottom poorest have only left the 3.86% of the 
total available income to survive. The data shows an upward trend for the Canadian coefficient, 
and certainly for all of them. It seems, as 2007-08 was a year when income equality starts to 
improve; however it could presumably be linked to the global 2007-08 financial crisis. It is 
considered for many economists to have been the worst financial crisis since the great 
depression of the 1930s. The trend analysis after 2007-08 shows a flat trend, in other words, 
despite the terrible effects of the crisis, seemingly it has affected in greater proportion the ones 
at the top, curtailing somehow the gap between the haves and haves-Nots. 
Another aspect to highlight is the importance of studying the income of individuals in its after-
tax form.  This allows the study to measure the actual effects of taxation on inequality, by 
removing the tax paid from the total income. 
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Comparative Social Assistance Caseload and Unemployment Analysis 
 
Figure 5: London’s average annual Social Assistance Caseload and unemployment from 1993 to 2013 
 
Sources:  
  Caseload:  
  Data provided by the City of London’s planning and Research Department 
Unemployment:  
CANSIM Table 282-0123 Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by provinces, territories and economic regions based 
on 2011 Census boundaries, annual (1,2,3,4,5) 
Survey or program details: Labour Force Survey – 3701, Geography (2,6), London, Ontario [3560]  
 
 
The analysis of the Social Assistance Caseload data evidence for the city of London shows a 
similar behaviour as the previously Ontario analysis in figure 1. When comparing both SA 
caseload and unemployment, there is a visual direct correlation of 61.6%, which will be 
confirmed in the multiple regression analysis. The reason behind this close correlation could be 
found in the logic of the higher the unemployment the higher the need to request social 
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assistance help, after exhausting employment insurance. Due to the gravity of the 2007-08 
global financial crisis, it is expected, that unemployment would last more than a year, the 
average employment insurance time coverage would have run out; therefore, requiring further 
aids, such as social assistance. 
Comparative GDP and Population Analysis 
 
Figure 6: Ontario’s GDP and London’s population from 1991 to 2003 
 
Sources:  
Population: 
CANSIM Table 051-0056 Estimates of population by census metropolitan area, sex and age group for July 1, based on 
the Standard Geographical Classification (SGC) 2011, annual (persons)(1,2,3,4,5,7,8) 
Survey or program details: 
Estimates of Population by Age and Sex for Census Divisions, Census Metropolitan Areas and Economic Regions 
(Component Method) – 3608 
Estimate: Due to lack of data, it was necessary to estimate the first 3 years using the 20 years average growth (0.8%) 
  GDP: 
CANSIM Table 282-0123 Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by provinces, territories and economic regions based 
on 2011 Census boundaries, annual (1,2,3,4,5) 
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Survey or program details: Labour Force Survey - 3701 
  
Two important disclosures here: (1) There was not available consistent population data for the 
years 1991, 1992, and 1993, therefore, it was necessary an estimate using the last 20 year 
growth rate average; (2) there was not GDP available for the city of London alone, in which case 
it was necessary to use the Ontario’s GDP as a proxy for the city of London.  
It appears to be some direct correlation between GDP and population growth. There is some 
evidence in UK that partially links population growth with improvements in GDP, “The fact that 
populations and economic output tend to grow in tandem, albeit at different rates, has been 
well-documented” (Berry, 2014) 
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MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 Table 1:  Correlation Matrix 
    GINI Unemploy- ment Rate GDP Ontario Population Caseload 
    X1 X2 X3 X4 Y1 
GINI X1 100.0% -57.9% 21.5% 35.3% -44.3% 
Unemploy- 
ment Rate X2 -57.9% 100.0% -0.3% -14.4% 61.6%* 
GDP 
Ontario X3 21.5% -0.3% 100.0% 93.3% -47.0% 
Population X4 35.3% -14.4% 93.3% 100.0% -43.3% 
Caseload Y1 -44.3% 61.6%* -47.0% -43.3% 100.0% 
 
Given the R Squared (R2), 68% of the variability of the dependent variable Y1, SA Caseload, is 
explained by the 4 explanatory variables. Given the p-value of the F statistic computed in the 
ANOVA table, and given the significance level of 5%, the information brought by the 
explanatory variables is significantly better than what a basic mean would bring.  
Based on the Type III sum of squares, the following variables bring significant information to 
explain the variability of the dependent variable caseload: Unemployment rate, GDP and 
population.  
Among the explanatory variables based on the Type III sum of squares, variable 
Unemployment: X2 is the most influential. 
Based on the Type III sum of squares, the variable GINI do not bring significant information to 
explain the variability the dependent variable caseload. 
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The following is the resulting Equation of the model (Y1): 
Y1 = - 13961.9449508123 - 10227.4355517304*X1 + 1343.72401566956*X2 -
0.0252155117156789*X3 + 0.0642544729951804*X4 
 
Y1: London’s Caseload; X1: London’s Gini Coefficient; X2: London’s Unemployment rate; X3: 
GDP Ontario; X4: London’s Population. The equation model would allow us to predict the 
dependent variable Y1 given X values for the independent variables.  
Using the predictive value of the equation, if unemployment rate rises by 1 percent point, it is 
expected to increase the average SA caseload in 1,343 additional cases. For the GDP, by 
increasing 10%, the SA caseload goes down by 554 cases. Finally, when the population 
increases by 10%, the SA caseload is expected to increase by 2,484 cases. 
For more details on how to use the predictive value of the equation, please see predictions and 
residuals (Y1) in the appendix.  
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MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
Comparative Dependent and Independent Variable Analysis 
 
Figure 7: London’s Gini Coefficient and Social Asistance Caseload from 1993 to 2013 
 
Sources:  
  Caseload: Data provided by the City of London’s planning and Research Department 
Gini Coefficient: CANSIM Table 326-0021 Consumer Price Index (Percentage Change (period-to-period)), annual 
(2002=100)(2,9) 
Table 204-0002 High income trends of tax filers in Canada, provinces and census metropolitan areas (CMA), specific 
geographic area thresholds, annual (1,2,3,4) 
 
 
As per the correlation matrix model results, the independent variable X1 – Gini coefficient does 
not bring significant information to explain the dependent variable Y1 – Social assistance 
caseload. However, the model as a whole well explains the dependent variable in 68%.  
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Likewise, as previously stated in the Ontario’s social assistance caseload and Gini coefficient 
analysis, London’s results coincide in an inverse correlation, this time of 44.3%. Again, The 
relationship between these two variables is complex due to the introduction exogenous 
variables such as policy interventions and macroeconomic cycles. London’s social assistance 
(SA) caseload has been affected for policy and macroeconomic factors, equally shared at a 
Provincial, and Federal level.  
Although, local income levels and structures of wealth affecting the Gini coefficient are still 
affected by Federal and Provincial fiscal policies and macroeconomic cycles, there are local 
economic dynamics influencing income equality such as cost of living and unemployment7. It is 
important to highlight that although, the Gini Coefficient for London decreased since 1993 to 
2013 by 2.3%, that the total increase since a decade before is considerably higher at 11.53%, 
displaying an upward trend. Even though, there is no causality between variables, income 
inequality by itself is an important measure of the economic health of the local population, and 
it is at this level where opportunities for municipal government policies could impact positively. 
London’s Social Assistance caseload was equally affected by the Provincial policy changes 
introduced in 1995 with the implementation of the “Common Sense Revolution” which cut 
welfare rates by 21.6%; thus prompting London’s SA caseload decline of 44%. Another 
worldwide factor affecting greatly the SA caseload was the 2008 financial crisis, prompting an 
increase of about 46% in the London’s total caseload.  
  
                                                          
7 Please see Local Perspective Section for more detail 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
For the City of London’s data study in the areas of social assistance, unemployment, population, 
and income inequality, we ask the research question in the local government context: Is income 
inequality affecting the social assistance caseload in London, Ontario? The data evidence 
suggests that income inequality alone is perhaps not the most important driver of social 
assistance caseload, but instead the unemployment rate variable with 61.6% correlation; 
however, the four variables together as a model (Income inequality, unemployment, GDP8 and 
population) show a strong 68%9 in explaining the total variability of social assistance caseload.  
The literature review alerted us about finding a negative relationship between income 
inequality and social assistance caseload variables, which are explained by important 
endogenous variables such as such as socio-economic policy interventions and macroeconomic 
cycles have played and important role in altering this relationship.  
Aside from the variable relationships, important Gini coefficient data has been collected, 
shedding light on London’s state of the Income Inequality. The data evidence for the Gini 
Coefficient of Income Inequality shows that in average the top 1% of Londoners have 72.33% of 
the total income of the city, or even more dramatic 50% of the bottom poorest Londoner have 
only left the 3.86% of the total available income to survive. Although, the research study does 
not show causal relationship between income inequality and social assistance caseload, or vice 
versa, they illustrate a reciprocal dependence to each other. Furthermore, it is important to 
recognize the overall important challenges that income inequality has in the local socio-
                                                          
8 GDP data pertains to Ontario, as specific data for London was not available. 
9 Given the R Squared (R2), 68% of the variability of the dependent variable Y1, SA Caseload, is explained by the 4 explanatory 
variables 
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economic upward mobility spectrum.  
This Major Research Project concludes with a qualified refusal of the paper’s thesis: has the rise 
in the Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality has increased the Social Assistance Services 
caseload in London-Ontario since 1993 until 2013? No, because the data evidence shows no 
effect of Gini coefficient over the dependent variable of social assistance for this period; and 
yes, because the variable relationship seems to have been altered by endogenous factors such 
as policy intervention and macroeconomic cycles, which are not easily quantifiable by statistical 
methods alone  
Social assistance caseload is affected by a myriad of variables including local economic 
dynamics, provincial socio-economic policies and global economic cycles. 
Chief among socio-economic policies: Subsidy rates reduction, introduction of child benefit, tax 
cuts, social programs dismantlement, Income transfer decline; and amongst economic cycles: 
unemployment, deindustrialization, de-unionization and globalization. 
As per evidence shows, in term of anticipating social assistance caseload value, unemployment 
rate will provide a good forecasting statistical tool. 
It is paramount to recognize for federal, provincial and local policy makers the historical 
importance of paying attention to current problems such as mounting income inequality gap; 
increasing poverty and social assistance caseloads, because of their effective control depends 
the achievement of the Canadian ideals of a diverse and prosperous modern society or the 
contrary, a society where few wealthy impose their priorities, compromising the Canadian 
democratic values and the sustainability as a fair society where we all can dare to dream to 
build a richer and stronger society where the public good wins over private interests. 
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POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR ACTION 
 
When designing public policy at the local government level that reduces the level of income 
inequality, and social assistance caseloads, the Provincial and Federal levels of government 
have real policy jurisdiction and scope to affect its desired effects; instead, local governments 
are left with very few policy tools to try to affect socio-economic results. Starting by the federal 
and Provincial level and then following by a collection of creative local policy changes that may 
provide progressive socio-economic effects: 
 
Federal and Provincial Policy Recommendations 
Trish Hennessy is Director of Strategic Issues with the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
asked Canadian leading experts about how to solve the worsening income inequality problem, 
and solicited them to submit an idea they think would contribute to reducing inequality. The 
experts weighed in as follows: 
Closing the gap between rich and poor requires government to take action at both ends of the 
income scale. To reduce incomes of the top 10% we need progressive tax policies, many of 
which were described in the Alternative Federal Budget 2012 tax chapter. (Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives, 2016). In brief they include: 
(1) Increasing tax rates on top incomes; (2) Reversing the race to the bottom with corporate tax 
cuts; (3) Eliminating unfair tax preferences, closing tax loopholes and access to tax havens; (4) 
Applying financial activities or transactions taxes; (5) Introducing an inheritance tax on large 
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estates. (Howlett, 2012) 
It is important to point out that simply raising the income tax rate on the top income brackets 
will not do the job as the wealthiest get most of their income from investments, not salary, and 
because they will use loopholes and tax havens to avoid paying taxes. That is why we put 
forward a package of tax measures that would together do the job. More progressive taxes are 
probably the most effective way governments can fix the damage done by the market, which is 
accelerating income inequality. But there are several other ways government can try to rein in 
the inequality-creating market. (Howlett, 2012) These would include: 
(1) Enacting laws that would support unions, their ability to organize and to bargain collectively; 
(2) Ensuring that immigration policies and temporary worker programs do not under-cut wages 
of Canadian workers; (3) Investing in training and higher education to ensure that there is a 
highly skilled work force and making sure that higher education is fully accessible to all; (4) 
Adopting an industrial strategy that supports job creation and full employment by diversifying 
the economy away from over-reliance on resource extraction, investing in public infrastructure, 
and promoting the green economy. (Howlett, 2012) 
To raise the incomes of those on the lower end of the scale we need a national poverty 
reduction plan that would include the following: 
(1) Implement a national housing strategy that would involve building a minimum of 25,000 
social housing units per year (this will likely require expenditures of $1.5 billion annually); (2) 
Implement a national child care and early childhood education program, which will especially 
help low-income single parents in their ability to get jobs (Saulnier, 2012); (3) Improve the 
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Employment Insurance program so that more of those who become unemployed can qualify for 
benefits and are prevented from falling into poverty, from which it can be difficult to escape; 
(4) Reinstate a federal minimum wage and indexing it to inflation to ensure that someone 
working full-time will be able to escape poverty; (5) Create a national pharmacare plan that 
would provide first-dollar coverage for prescription drugs, (7)removing a major barrier to 
employment for those on welfare; (8) Implement a plan to reduce First Nations and Aboriginal 
poverty (MacKinnon, 2012); and (9) a fully-funded higher education (university and college) 
would allow students to graduate without carrying crippling debt, ensuring that society would 
realize full and immediate economic and social returns of a highly educated society. (Hennessy, 
2012) 
 
Local Policy Recommendations 
 
Progressive Taxation: Graduated Property Tax 
Canadian municipalities have limited revenue tools with a vast array of service demands. How 
can we create more revenue generating options, but most importantly, how to make them less 
regressive, which disproportionally hurt the citizens with the lowest incomes, and to adopt a 
more progressive system which taxes higher the most able to pay. (Thompson, 2014).  
A progressive residential property tax that is geared-to-income would align very well with 
London’s Ending Poverty Initiative goal to ending poverty within one generation.  
The possibility for the City of London to adopt a graduated residential property tax as a tool 
that both can boost revenues and improve income equality, and end poverty.  A graduated 
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property tax method is tax with an incremental rate. It is a proxy for a geared-to-income system 
in the sense that the tax rate is progressive to the value of the residential dwelling, that is, the 
more expensive the dwelling the higher the property taxes, similarly as the federal and 
provincial income taxes currently do. (Cardona, 2016).  
 
City of London - Ending Poverty Initiative 
 
As one of the City of London, Mayor Matt Brown’s staple policies of his administration, the 
Ending Poverty Initiative has potential to decrease poverty and social assistance caseloads, one 
of the components of income inequality. 
The aim is to end poverty in London in 20 years, which means removing 3,100 Londoners from 
poverty each year (as measured by Statistics Canada’s low-income measure) 
The goal in the next 12 months for this initiative is to: develop a campaign to educate the 
community on poverty; accelerate skills-training programs to meet local labour market needs, 
become a basic income guarantee pilot site, invest in housing allowances to support flexible 
permanent residency; leverage funding and investing in redeveloping social housing; reduce 
transit costs for low-income earners; allow children under 12 to ride public transit for free; 
increase number of licensed childcare spaces; reduce wait time to receive childcare subsidy; 
and support development of regional food policy council charged with developing food 
security. (City of London, 2016) 
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APPENDIX Multiple Linear Regression 
Table 2:  Multiple Regression Variable Data Values 
Years Caseload GINI 
Unemployment 
Rate GDP Ontario Population 
1991 8,789 0.533 7.758 219,686 386,591 
1992 12,823 0.535 8.858 227,305 391,037 
1993 14,389 0.563 8.700 234,403 426,265 
1994 13,910 0.566 7.700 241,060 429,640 
1995 13,361 0.523 7.767 247,916 433,042 
1996 12,434 0.528 8.567 253,468 436,471 
1997 12,644 0.559 8.142 266,936 439,584 
1998 11,965 0.548 6.341 279,540 442,122 
1999 11,031 0.571 6.758 296,908 446,122 
2000 9,909 0.592 6.025 319,116 450,871 
2001 8,588 0.561 6.200 334,692 453,092 
2002 8,276 0.558 7.000 354,572 458,647 
2003 7,959 0.560 6.600 371,905 462,738 
2004 7,929 0.575 5.700 388,809 467,622 
2005 7,765 0.584 6.300 409,736 471,711 
2006 7,515 0.562 6.000 430,671 475,903 
2007 7,524 0.572 6.100 450,039 478,492 
2008 8,192 0.571 7.000 473,150 481,249 
2009 9,945 0.555 9.800 479,175 483,045 
2010 10,636 0.556 8.500 502,831 486,129 
2011 10,889 0.549 8.500 524,915 489,461 
2012 10,911 0.544 8.000 537,329 494,437 
2013 10,976 0.548 7.900 554,911 498,687 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Summary statistics (Quantitative data) 
  Variable 
Observation
s 
Obs. 
with 
missin
g data 
Obs. 
withou
t 
missing 
data 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m Mean 
Std. 
deviatio
n 
Caseload Y1 23 0 23 7,515 14,389 10,363 2,206 
GINI X1 23 0 23 0.523 0.592 0.557 0.017 
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Unemployment 
Rate X2 23 0 23 5.700 9.800 7.401 1.137 
GDP Ontario X3 23 0 23 219,686 554,911 
365,17
7 111,305 
Population X4 23 0 23 386,591 498,687 
455,78
1 30,265 
 
 
Multicolinearity statistics: 
    
  
GINI Unemployment Rate 
GDP 
Ontario 
Populat
ion 
  
 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 
  
 
Tolerance 0.574 0.627 0.109 0.102 
  
 
VIF 1.743 1.596 9.138 9.789 
  
        
        
 
Regression of variable Y1: 
    
        
 
Goodness of fit statistics (Y1): 
    
        
 
Observatio
ns 23 
     
 
Sum of 
weights 23 
     
 
DF 18 
     
 
R² 0.677 
     
 
Adjusted 
R² 0.605 
     
 
MSE 1920184.580 
     
 
RMSE 1385.707 
     
 
MAPE 10.234 
     
 
DW 1.125 
     
 
Cp 5.000 
     
 
AIC 337.125 
     
 
SBC 342.802 
     
 
PC 0.502 
     
 
Press 
68796568
.566 
     
 
Q² 0.357 
     
        
        
 
Analysis of variance  (Y1): 
    
        
 
Source DF 
Sum of 
squares 
Mean 
squares F Pr > F 
 
 
Model 4 
72495537.6
05 
18123884
.401 9.439 0.000 
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Error 18 
34563322.4
46 
1920184.
580 
   
 
Corrected 
Total 22 
107058860.
051       
 
 
Computed against model Y=Mean(Y) 
    
        
        
 
Type I Sum of Squares analysis (Y1): 
    
        
 
Source DF 
Sum of 
squares 
Mean 
squares F Pr > F 
 
GINI X1 1 
20985914.6
57 
20985914
.657 10.929 0.004 
 Unemploy-
ment Rate X2 1 
20773874.6
22 
20773874
.622 10.819 0.004 
 
GDP Ontario X3 1 
22236527.1
33 
22236527
.133 11.580 0.003 
 
Population X4 1 
8499221.19
4 
8499221.
194 4.426 0.050 
 
        
        
 
Type III Sum of Squares analysis (Y1): 
    
        
 
Source DF 
Sum of 
squares 
Mean 
squares F Pr > F 
 
GINI X1 1 391284.897 
391284.8
97 0.204 0.657 
 Unemploy-
ment Rate X2 1 
32188517.2
32 
32188517
.232 16.763 0.001 
 
GDP Ontario X3 1 
18963534.9
37 
18963534
.937 9.876 0.006 
 
Population X4 1 
8499221.19
4 
8499221.
194 4.426 0.050 
 
        
        
 
Model parameters (Y1): 
     
        
 
Source Value 
Standard 
error t Pr > |t| 
Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound 
(95%) 
 
Intercept 
-
13961.94
5 15767.680 -0.885 0.388 -47088.611 19164.721 
GINI X1 
-
10227.43
6 22656.441 -0.451 0.657 -57826.853 37371.982 
Unemploy-
ment Rate X2 1343.724 328.194 4.094 0.001 654.213 2033.235 
GDP Ontario X3 -0.025 0.008 -3.143 0.006 -0.042 -0.008 
Population X4 0.064 0.031 2.104 0.050 0.000 0.128 
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Standardized coefficients (Y1): 
    
        
 
Sourc
e Value 
Standard 
error t 
Pr > 
|t| 
Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound 
(95%) 
GINI X1 
-
0.080 0.177 
-
0.451 0.657 -0.451 0.292 
Unemployment 
Rate X2 0.693 0.169 4.094 0.001 0.337 1.048 
GDP Ontario X3 
-
1.272 0.405 
-
3.143 0.006 -2.123 -0.422 
Population X4 0.882 0.419 2.104 0.050 0.001 1.762 
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Predictions and residuals (Y1): 
  
GINI 
Unemp
loymen
t Rate 
GDP 
Ontario Population 
Caseloa
d 
            
O
bs
er
va
tio
n 
W
ei
gh
t 
X1 X2 X3 X4 Y1 Pred(Y1) Residual 
Std. 
residual 
Studenti
zed 
residual
s 
Std. 
dev. on 
pred. 
(Mean) 
Lower 
bound 
95% 
(Mean) 
Upper 
bound 
95% 
(Mean) 
Std. dev. on 
pred. 
(Observation
) 
Lower bound 
95% 
(Observation) 
Upper bound 
95% 
(Observation) Adjusted Pred. Cook's D 
1991 1 0.53 7.76 219686.0 386591.0 8789.2 10314.6 -1525.5 -1.1 -1.7 1040.3 8129.1 12500.1 1732.7 6674.3 13954.9 12284.5 0.7 
1992 1 0.53 8.86 227305.0 391037.0 12823.0 11867.2 955.8 0.7 0.9 937.1 9898.6 13835.9 1672.8 8352.8 15381.7 11061.9 0.1 
1993 1 0.56 8.70 234403.0 426264.6 14388.7 13449.6 939.1 0.7 0.8 745.4 11883.6 15015.6 1573.5 10143.9 16755.3 13067.2 0.1 
1994 1 0.57 7.70 241060.0 429639.9 13910.4 12127.7 1782.7 1.3 1.4 565.4 10939.8 13315.7 1496.6 8983.4 15272.0 11771.6 0.1 
1995 1 0.52 7.77 247916.0 433042.0 13360.8 12697.6 663.2 0.5 0.6 841.5 10929.6 14465.6 1621.2 9291.5 16103.6 12310.1 0.0 
1996 1 0.53 8.57 253468.0 436471.0 12433.7 13808.2 -1374.5 -1.0 -1.2 796.3 12135.2 15481.1 1598.2 10450.4 17165.9 14485.9 0.1 
1997 1 0.56 8.14 266936.0 439584.0 12644.0 12771.7 -127.7 -0.1 -0.1 577.9 11557.5 13985.8 1501.4 9617.4 15926.0 12798.5 0.0 
1998 1 0.55 6.34 279540.0 442122.0 11964.7 10311.4 1653.3 1.2 1.3 608.1 9033.9 11588.9 1513.3 7132.2 13490.6 9917.1 0.1 
1999 1 0.57 6.76 296908.0 446122.0 11031.0 10455.1 575.9 0.4 0.4 457.1 9494.8 11415.5 1459.2 7389.6 13520.7 10384.8 0.0 
2000 1 0.59 6.03 319116.0 450871.0 9908.9 9005.3 903.6 0.7 0.8 718.2 7496.3 10514.3 1560.8 5726.2 12284.4 8673.3 0.0 
2001 1 0.56 6.20 334692.0 453092.0 8588.3 9306.3 -718.0 -0.5 -0.5 452.9 8354.7 10257.9 1457.9 6243.5 12369.2 9392.2 0.0 
2002 1 0.56 7.00 354572.0 458647.0 8276.0 10267.7 -1991.7 -1.4 -1.5 341.4 9550.4 10985.0 1427.1 7269.4 13266.0 10396.4 0.0 
2003 1 0.56 6.60 371905.0 462738.0 7958.6 9538.1 -1579.5 -1.1 -1.2 382.8 8733.9 10342.3 1437.6 6517.8 12558.4 9668.6 0.0 
2004 1 0.58 5.70 388809.0 467622.0 7929.4 8057.8 -128.4 -0.1 -0.1 535.1 6933.6 9182.1 1485.4 4937.0 11178.6 8080.3 0.0 
2005 1 0.58 6.30 409736.0 471711.0 7765.3 8510.3 -745.1 -0.5 -0.6 550.3 7354.2 9666.4 1491.0 5377.9 11642.7 8649.8 0.0 
2006 1 0.56 6.00 430671.0 475903.0 7514.7 8074.9 -560.2 -0.4 -0.4 539.3 6941.8 9208.0 1487.0 4950.9 11198.9 8174.9 0.0 
2007 1 0.57 6.10 450039.0 478492.0 7524.0 7784.3 -260.3 -0.2 -0.2 511.5 6709.7 8859.0 1477.1 4681.1 10887.6 7825.4 0.0 
2008 1 0.57 7.00 473150.0 481249.0 8191.9 8597.8 -405.8 -0.3 -0.3 468.0 7614.5 9581.0 1462.6 5524.9 11670.6 8650.0 0.0 
2009 1 0.55 9.80 479175.0 483045.0 9944.8 12488.2 -2543.4 -1.8 -2.3 830.3 10743.7 14232.7 1615.4 9094.3 15882.1 13913.0 0.6 
2010 1 0.56 8.50 502831.0 486129.0 10636.1 10328.6 307.5 0.2 0.2 556.0 9160.5 11496.7 1493.1 7191.7 13465.5 10269.6 0.0 
2011 1 0.55 8.50 524915.0 489461.0 10889.1 10055.0 834.1 0.6 0.7 595.3 8804.2 11305.7 1508.2 6886.4 13223.6 9866.2 0.0 
2012 1 0.54 8.00 537329.0 494437.0 10910.6 9446.2 1464.4 1.1 1.2 636.0 8110.0 10782.4 1524.7 6243.0 12649.5 9055.4 0.1 
2013 1 0.55 7.90 554911.0 498687.0 10976.0 9095.3 1880.7 1.4 1.5 638.8 7753.3 10437.2 1525.8 5889.6 12300.9 8587.8 0.1 
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Table 3:  Ontario's Social Assistance & Income Inequality data values from 1993 to 2013 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 Caseload 
M N/A N/A 390 380 362 310 262 216 197 195 
 Gini 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.61 
 
            Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Caseload 
M 192 192 198 199 195 202 238 251 261 260 253 
Gini 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.61 
 
 
Table 4:  Summary of Ontario’s Social Assistance and Income Inequality Policy Evolution 
 
Year 
 
Ontario Social Assistance Policies 
 
Ontario Income Equality Policies 
1989 A number of progressive welfare reforms took 
place in Ontario in 1989 and 1991 as a direct 
result of the Transitions report of the Social 
Assistance Review Committee in 1988 
Within the period from 1981 to 1999 cutbacks 
to government spending on social programs 
also contributed to the rise in inequality The 
evidence suggests that globalization has 
affected income inequality. Trade openness is 
clearly an important factor behind the rise in 
inequality across Canadian provinces.  
1990 The 1990s recession hit Ontario hard - welfare 
dependency skyrocketed and the cap on CAP 
added more fiscal pressure on the province 
 
1991 When the NDP came to power in 1991, they 
improved earnings exemptions, increased 
rates of assistance and made the system more 
equitable 
 
1992 A 1992 advisory group report commissioned 
by the government advocated more spending 
on benefit improvements and social supports 
to help people to move to self-sufficiency; the 
government ignored the report because it had 
already shifted into cost-containment mode.  
The Provincial Auditor General’s Reports in 
1992 and subsequent years said the province 
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Year 
 
Ontario Social Assistance Policies 
 
Ontario Income Equality Policies 
was losing hundreds of millions of dollars to 
fraud and program mismanagement 
1993 In 1993, the government released Turning 
Point, a discussion paper that included 
proposals for an Ontario Child Income 
Program, an Ontario Adult Benefit and Job 
Link; the new programs were to take effect in 
1995, but only Joblink would survive the 
transition to the new Tory government that 
year. 
 
1994 1994 - a few cuts in basic and special 
assistance, but much more emphasis on fraud 
Investigations and more rigid application of 
controls. 
 
 
1995 1995 - Harris government won the provincial 
election (June). 
21.6% welfare rate cut (October 1995) for 
everyone (except seniors and disabled) on 
welfare. 
Thousands of single parents in common-law 
relationships saw their benefits cut off (FBA) or 
cut back; formerly, the province had a three-
year grace period, but the second adult was 
considered a boarder. 
Youth were cut off welfare except in 
exceptional cases. 
October 1995 - province-wide welfare fraud 
line introduced. 
 
1996 By 1996, the province had saved $8.6 million 
(one-third of original estimated savings). 
Cuts in direct funding to municipal social 
services agencies and cuts in transfers to 
municipalities, resulting in lower municipal 
grants to those same agencies. 
 
1997 Ontario signed a six-year deal with Andersen 
Consulting to find efficiencies in the system 
and to improve the computer technology. 
 
1998 June 1997: the government introduced its Post-1998, Ontario’s earnings gap shrank back 
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Year 
 
Ontario Social Assistance Policies 
 
Ontario Income Equality Policies 
welfare reform legislation, the Social 
Assistance Reform Act, to take effect in 
January 1998 
In 1998, the federal and provincial 
governments joined together on the creation 
of the National Child Benefit Supplement 
(NCBS), an additional income benefit for 
families with children in low income. The 
NCBS, however, specifically allowed the 
provinces to claw back that benefit from 
families who were receiving social assistance. 
to below national levels. But that has not 
translated to a better-than-average distribution 
of incomes at the end of the day, in after-tax 
terms 
2003 In 2003, a new provincial government, led by 
former Premier Dalton McGuinty, was elected. 
It was expected that this new government 
would reverse at least some of the damage to 
social assistance, but progress has been 
halting, to say the least 
 
2004 The McGuinty government was elected in 
2003 with the expectation that the erosion of 
income security for those who qualify for 
social assistance would be reversed. The 
erosion of rates compared to the poverty line 
may have slowed after that election, but only 
couples with two children on OW experience a 
smaller poverty gap today compared to 2003 
 
2008  Federal program cuts to unemployment 
insurance have had a grave impact on Ontario 
workers suffering from the 2008 recession 
2009 The Ontario Child Benefit has proven to be a 
real workhorse: in 2009, the OCB was 
increased to a maximum of $1,100 annually 
per child in that year. By 2013, more than 
530,000 families received a benefit worth a 
maximum of $1,210 per child. 
Ontario’s slow recovery from the 2008 
recession and devastating losses to 
employment in the manufacturing and 
resource sectors will now be further challenged 
by cuts in the public sector and income transfer 
programs. 
2011 In the 2011 budget, Ontario introduced the 
Trillium Benefit. It combined three pre-existing 
tax credits available to all low-income 
Ontarians. These credits were formerly paid 
out either quarterly or in an annual lump sum 
Ontario’s budget plan asks almost nothing of 
high-income Ontarians who are taking home 
more than ever 
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Year 
 
Ontario Social Assistance Policies 
 
Ontario Income Equality Policies 
after-tax filing 
2012 Starting in 2012, they began to be paid on a 
monthly basis. The change did not increase 
total benefit income, but the monthly delivery 
provided a more stable source of funds to 
mitigate cost of living. The Trillium Benefit and 
the federal GST credit are both adjusted for 
inflation to protect against the erosion of their 
value due to the rising cost of living 
Today, 2012, Ontario is at or near the bottom 
of the country in measures of income inequality 
and economic security 
2013 Other reforms were introduced in 2013, such 
as increased employment exemptions, asset 
levels and gift amounts, were welcomed by 
advocates as positive contributions to 
improving the programs. However, benefit 
reductions proposed or enacted in 2012 and 
2014 were met with significant resistance. 
Government either abandoned these changes 
or mitigated the negative impact of the 
changes with new investments 
Annual top ups of $14 a month in 2013. 
Ontario’s budgets for the last fifteen years have 
repeatedly prioritized tax cuts while casting 
concomitant cuts to social programs as 
necessities rather than choices. Social policies 
that temper inequalities experienced by 
women and racialized communities have been 
dismantled. Social programs that benefit all 
Ontarians and redistribute income through free 
public services such as education and health 
care face relentless budget pressure. 
2014 By 2014, the gap had widened dramatically to 
59%. People receiving benefits from Ontario’s 
social assistance programs are living in a 
greater depth of poverty now than a 
generation ago 
Annual top ups of $25 a month in 2014 
Income transfer programs such as social 
assistance and disability have declined 
precipitously as inflation has outpaced meager 
increases. 
2015 As of December 2015, there were 900,000 
Ontarians—654,000 adults and 253,000 
children—relying on Ontario Works and ODSP 
to meet their basic needs.  
Annual top ups of $20 a month in 2015 
 
 
Sources: (Mehra, 2012), (Yalnizyan , 2007), (Tiessen, 2016), and (Lankin & Sheikh , 2012) & 
http://www.canadiansocialresearch.net/1990s_welfare_reforms.htm 
 
